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ABSTRACT
This paper is focused on the effect that the exchange of management information has on
client and/or supplier relationships. Moreover, this study extends the concept of the
usefulness of management control information to inter-organizational relationships,
analysing how the scope of such information affects continuity expectations, and how these
in turn influence opportunistic behaviour and the mutual adaptation of production
systems. The data was gathered from 104 purchasing and 90 sales managers of equipment
manufacturers on the nature of their respective relationships with their suppliers/ clients.
The results confirm that the use of broad-scope management control information sharing
in buyer-supplier relationships increases continuity expectations and reduces
opportunistic behaviour.
KEY WORDS: Management accounting, management control information sharing,
buyer-supplier relationships, continuity expectations, opportunistic behaviours.
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RESUMEN
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el efecto que ejerce el intercambio de información de
gestión sobre las relaciones con clientes y/o proveedores. Para ello, se extiende el concepto
de la utilidad de información de control de gestión a las relaciones ínter-organizativas,
analizando cómo su contenido afecta a las expectativas de continuidad y éstas a su vez
influyen en el comportamiento oportunista y en la adaptación mutua de sistemas de
producción. Los datos analizados se han obtenido de las relaciones entre 104 directores de
compras y  90 directores de ventas de empresas industriales con sus proveedores y clientes.
Los resultados confirman que utilizar información compartida de control de gestión con un
contenido más amplio en las relaciones compredor/proveedor favorece la creación de
expectativas de continuidad y reduce comportamientos oportunistas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Contabilidad de gestión, información compartida de control de gestión,
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INTRODUCTION
Interorganizational relationships involve a nascent form of cooperation between firms in
order to obtain mutual competitive advantages, such as access to new resources or
markets. Different facets of these relationships have been studied in fields such as
business organization (Dyer, 1996), marketing (Wuyts and Geykens, 2005), or management
accounting (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2006). Within this latter field, studies
have looked at the role of management control systems in supply chain management,
where buyers and suppliers use management information to improve coordination, reduce
opportunistic behaviours and supply times and/or transaction costs (Van der Meer-Kooistra
and Vosselman, 2006). 
Management control literature considers management control information sharing to be an
important tool to coordinate and control joint activities between companies (Tomkins,
2001; Dekker, 2004). Thus, Van der Meer-Koistra and Vosselman (2000) found that
information flow is a crucial element for the development of cooperative relationships
between companies, especially in the supply chain between buyers and suppliers (Dekker,
2004). However, the characteristics that shared information in an interorganizational
relationship should have in order to improve coordination and establish relationships that
are long-lasting and beneficial for both parties are still unknown. Management control
literature on interorganizational relationships has studied many cases to describe
management control techniques and systems within the supply chain, but has paid little
attention to the content of the information that these systems should provide in the buyer-
supplier relationships (Dekker, 2004); in addition, these studies do not allow for
generalization and comparison of the results (Frances and Garnsey, 1996; Dekker, 2004;
Chua and Mahama, 2007).
This paper analyzes the content of shared management control information in buyer-
supplier relationships. It proposes a model that examines how broader content of
management control information affects continuity expectations. In addition, it analyzes
how these expectations influence opportunistic behaviours and production systems. By
doing so, the work attempts to enlarge on our understanding of the usefulness of
management control information beyond intra-organizational relationships, by considering
relationships between companies (e.g. customer and supplier). At the same time, it
enlarges on the effect of continuity expectations by analyzing the mediatory role that they
play in the relationship’s stability. All of this will allow more solid evidence to be
contributed on the role of shared management control information in buyer-supplier
relationships, thus allowing generalization and comparability of the results.
The empirical study focused on the collaborative relationships that manufacturers of
consumer goods have with their industrial customers and suppliers. A questionnaire was
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sent to purchasing and sales managers, in which the purchasing managers answered
questions on their relationship with a supplier with whom they collaborate and the sales
managers on their relationship with an industrial client. This allowed us to analyse the
perceptions from the two standpoints, assessing both similarities and differences
(Anderson and Narus, 1990). The results suggest that both purchasing managers and sales
managers consider that, in order to generate continuity expectations, it is very useful for
management control systems to supply information on future events, which are external to
the firm and of a long-term nature. The results also show that continuity expectations
reduce opportunistic behaviours in buyer-supplier relationships.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the following section describes the
theoretical model and formulates the hypotheses. The third section presents the research
methodology. The fourth section shows the results and, finally, the fifth section covers the
discussion and the conclusions arising from the work, as well as its limitations and
possible future lines of research.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The study of the role played by control and coordination in interorganizational relationships
has produced a range of reviews concerning management control issues (Binberg, 1998;
Speklé, 2001), analyzed through qualitative (Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003; Dekker,
2004) as well as quantitative studies (Munday, 1992; Kulp, 2002; Mahama, 2006). In
addition, these works have used different theoretical approaches, such as the transaction
costs theory (Gietzmann, 1996; Anderson and Dekker, 2005), the agent/network theory
(Mouritsen, Hansen and Hansen, 2001) or the agency theory (Sánchez, Vélez and Ramón,
2006). Such approaches show the enormous relevance of interorganizational relationships
in the supply chain in general (Kulp, 2002), and between buyers and suppliers in particular
(Frances and Garnsey, 1996; Anderson and Dekker, 2005).
Typically, the relationship between a buying company and its supplier is characterized by
the use of price as the only coordination mechanism (Kulp, 2002). However, as the
complexity or the importance of supply increases, the tendency is for a more cooperative
strategy (Munday, 1992; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). Information from
management control systems supports the development of a stable cooperative relationship
between companies and their suppliers and clients (Sánchez, Vélez and Ramón, 2006),
especially when oriented towards long-term relationships, where there is a continuity
expectation from the parties (Speklé, 2001; Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). This
management control information sharing enables firms to obtain lower cost products, to
control their joint productive processes better (Frances and Garnsey, 1996), to reduce lead
times, and to function more efficiently (Tomkins, 2001). 
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Increased competitiveness and the need for company innovation have made the search for
efficiency a top priority in the strategy developed by the parties involved in a collaborative
relationship (Anderson and Dekker, 2005). Both parties realize that the relationship’s
success depends on the other party and on a suitable flow of information due to the need
to coordinate activities and efforts in the most efficient way possible (Chua and Mahama,
2007). In this sense, the exchange of management information with broader content
facilitates the coordination of tasks as well as efforts between departments (Chenhall and
Morris, 1986; Chenhall, 2003). Broad-scope management information features more
sophisticated information, which encompasses information oriented geared towards the
future, that is external to the company, and that goes beyond the information typically
supplied by management control systems (e.g. financial information oriented towards the
past that is internal to the organization). Broader management information provides a
greater range of solutions for businesses to consider when making decisions (Bouwens and
Abernethy, 2000; Naranjo-Gil, 2004). 
The exchange of useful management control information affects the strategy developed by
the companies participating in the relationship (Mouritsen, Hansen and Hansen, 2001).
Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2007) found that the availability of a broader set of information
facilitates a change towards more cooperative and proactive strategies and stimulates
interdepartmental planning and the coordination of operations (Bouwens and Abernethy,
2000; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007). Along these lines, Bouwens and Abernethy (2000)
stated that in order to achieve effective decentralization and coordination of operations,
management needs more sophisticated management information with a greater content
range enabling it to face uncertainty and to optimize performance (Chua and Mahama,
2007). Abernethy and Guthrie (1994) found that broad scope, as opposed to reduced scope
management information makes it possible to increase the performance of business units
that follow more prospective strategies, such as cooperation between clients and suppliers
(Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007). Furthermore, it is the department managers on the
frontline, such as purchasing and sales managers, who are aware of the usefulness of broad
content information and its greater impact on performance and future continuity of the
company (Gul and Chia, 1994; Mia and Chenhall, 1994). 
Broad-scope management information not only improves performance but it also facilitates
planning joint activities in the organizations (Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Bouwens and
Abernethy, 2000), helps implements flexible and decentralized strategies (Naranjo-Gil
and Hartmann, 2007), and increases interdependence between business operations
(Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Perera, Harrison and Poole, 1997). It likewise enables
managers immersed in the management of an inter-organizational relationship to gain a
better understanding of the processes and activities developed by each of the parties
(Abernethy and Guthrie, 1994; Van der Meer-Koistraa and Vosselman, 2000).
Furthermore, this type of information means companies face complex and highly dynamic
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and uncertain situations such as those that arise in interorganizational relationships
(Munday, 1992; Mahama, 2006), reducing the risk of a break in the relationship. For that
reason, it may be expected that broad scope management information will increase the
continuity expectations that the purchasing and sales managers have of interorganizational
relationships. Thus, we set out our first hypothesis: 
H1: Sharing broad scope management control information will increase the continuity
expectations of the purchasing and sales managers in collaborative relationships.
Strong continuity expectations increase the level of joint action (Heide and John, 1990),
which affects the behaviours developed by the parties involved in the relationship. One party
may act in its own interests, thereby harming the other through its actions (Birnberg, 1998).
This behaviour may be apparent in price increases, a reduction in the quality of the products
exchanged or delivery delays (Stump and Heide, 1996; Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005).
Due to the relationships not always being equally beneficial for both parties, one of them
may break the agreements they had by reducing the quality of products supplied, falsifying
reports on costs or performance, increasing prices or delaying deliveries for their own
benefit (Stump and Heide, 1996). These opportunistic behaviours temporarily favour the
party that carries them out, and are detrimental to the one that bears them (Wuyts and
Geyskens, 2005). However, if both parties feel that the relationship will last over time, the
continuity expectation will increase, thereby increasing each party’s capacity to respond
(Frances and Garnsey, 1996; Stump and Heide, 1996) and reducing the reduction of
incentives for opportunistic behaviour. Thus, it may be expected that greater belief in
continuity will lead to a reduction in opportunistic behaviours in the relationship, as both
parties will act correctly so that the relationship will be successful. Taking this idea into
consideration, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H2: Greater continuity expectations entail less opportunistic behaviour on the part of
the purchasing and sales managers. 
Continuity expectations arise from the need to safeguard the assets involved and to manage
the uncertainty stemming from the relationship (Heide and John, 1990). The longer the
relationship lasts overtime, the greater the value of the investment in the assets adapted to
the other party (Heide and Stump, 1995), whether they are tangible assets such as
production systems or distribution channels (Sánchez, Vélez and Ramón, 2006) or whether
they are intangible assets such as employee training (Heide and Stump, 1995).
Furthermore, long-term relationships normally require investments in specific assets and
production systems for the relationship to work and continue over time (Gietzmann, 1996).
Heide and John (1990) analyzed the collaborative relationship from the buyer’s
perspective and they noted that the increase in the continuity expectation entails increases
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investment in specific assets, which leads to investment in a more efficient production
process as expectations are thought to exist that cooperation will last and future
transactions will take place (Noordewier, John and Nevin, 1990). Considering these ideas,
we formulated the following hypothesis:
H3: The greater the continuity expectations, the greater the influence wielded by one
party over the other party’s production systems.
Based on the previous hypotheses, a theoretical model was drawn up (Figure 1) to analyze
each of the relationships from the perspectives of the purchasing manager as well as the
sales manager.
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FIGURE 1.- THEORETICAL MODEL
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METHODOLOGY
Data collection and description
The previous hypotheses were contrasted with data obtained from questionnaires sent to
purchasing and sales managers at 1,3801 Spanish manufacturing companies listed in the
SIC2 under numbers 35, 36, and 37 according to the 2004 version of the DUNS 50000
database. The grounds for this selection are that the sectors must be industrial, in which
both buyer and supplier are organizations (Dyer, 1996). It is a question of original
equipment manufacturers, whose buyers are other wholesale or retailmanufacturers.
Management control information is crucial and relevant when suppliers deliver products
that are specific and important to each buyer. The supplier and the buyer have at least to
invest in specific assets, while cooperation and control are necessary to establish and
maintain the relationship (Dekker, 2004).
(1) From among the 1,380 companies in the sample, those companies with less than 20 employees were
excluded (as calls were made to 10% of companies with less than 20 employees from the sample during the
pilot study and it was confirmed that they employed the same staff for both the purchasing and the sales
functions, which could detract from the validity of their responses), as were those companies that would have
ceased to do business or that had delegated the role of purchasing or sales to another company.
(2) Standard industrial classification. These codes refer to companies that manufacture consumer goods: 35
for general machinery, 36 for electronic machinery, and 37 for transportation equipment.
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The questionnaire was developed following Dillman’s method (2000) that has been
demonstrated as perfectly acceptable in accounting and management control studies
(see Naranjo-Gil, 2006). Thus, our research was structured in three stages. Firstly,
interviews were held prior to sending out the questionnaire (a total of 4 sales
department managers were interviewed between the months of January and March,
2006), in which the topic’s relevance and the relationship between the variables were
confirmed. Secondly, a first draft of the questionnaire was drawn up by means of a
careful translation of the original measurement instrument taken from the review of the
literature. This draft was submitted for a first evaluation by eight researchers in the
field of organization and management control, who suggested various changes to the
survey’s design and wording and the organization of its questions. Lastly, the
questionnaire’s draft was pre-contrasted with six sales managers (2 purchasing
managers, 3 sales managers, and one technical manager familiar with the supplies. The
questionnaire was discussed with each of them in a personal interview of approximately
one hour in length, in which they were asked for an opinion on their understanding of
the individual items and the measurement instruments. On the basis of their
suggestions, the questions, and certain captions and headings were rephrased in the
questionnaire to facilitate understanding (Naranjo-Gil, 2006). 
The questionnaire was directed at purchasing and sales managers because, as is
considered in the literature (Cannon and Perreault, 1999), even though there are other
people within the company who might have ample knowledge of the client or the
supplier, the sales department managers are the ones who pool more information and
whose knowledge covers the majority of points asked about in the survey3. In addition,
so that their response would relate to a specific relationship, an explanation was
inserted at the beginning of the questionnaire which pointed out that: “The following
questions attempt to analyze aspects of your company and its relationship with the
supplier (client) with whom it has a certain degree of collaboration, the latter being
understood as that which is brought about when your company and your supplier
(client) work as if they were a team, allowing both companies to reach their
objectives and increase the profitability of their business.”
The questionnaires were sent out by post on September 15, 2006, as well as by email
over the months of November and December, 2006 and January, 2007, and the process
ended in February, 2007 with the receipt of a total of 198 questionnaires, of which 194
were useful (97.9%)4, 104 were from purchasing managers and 90 were from sales
Shared Management Information in Buyer/Supplier Relationships
(3) Examples of people who responded to this survey and their responsibilities are: “global purchasing
manager”, “sales manager”, “sales & marketing director”, purchasing managers and sales managers.
(4) It should be noted that a non-answer could become a serious problem if it were to show systematic
differences between those that respond and those that do not respond, and if such differences affected the
results. In order to resolve this problem, tests were carried out to demonstrate that there were no systematic
differences; a comparison of the answers for the first and the last people surveyed among the purchasing
executives and sales executives using the Chi-square Test for the total population based on the SIC code from
the original list and the response to the survey and the Chi-s quare Test for the SIC Code indicated that
neither the response from the purchasing executives nor from the sales executives differed between each
other, which shows that there is no systematic skew due to non-answers (Naranjo-Gil, 2006).
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managers, making the size of the sample comparable to previous studies (Kulp, 2002;
Mahama, 2006)5.
Measurement of variables 
Three criteria were identified in order to select the scale that would measure the variables.
Firstly, whenever possible, it should have been used in previous studies or other
accounting studies (Chenhall and Morris, 1986) or in the context of survey-based
interorganizational relationships (Heide and John, 1990; Heide and Stump, 1995; Wuyts
and Geykens, 2005). Secondly, it should have shown reliability and validity in the latter
studies. Lastly, its length should be as limited as possible (Naranjo-Gil, 2006). Although
the chosen scales were validated in intra-organizational environments (e.g. Chenhall and
Morris, 1986), we considered it advisable to transfer them to the interorganizational
context. In this sense, and according to Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003), an appropriate
departure point for the study of management control systems in new interorganizational
scenarios is to consider them as either intra-organizational management control systems or
as belonging to one sole business,. 
Usefulness of the scope of management control information sharing
The usefulness of management control information is defined as its importance and
relevance as perceived by the person who should take a particular decision (Chenhall and
Morris, 1986). Such information may be considered useful whenever managers see that it
can help them control areas under their responsibility (Bouwens and Abernethy, 2000).
The scope reflects the content of the management control information. This content is
divided in three aspects: range (if it contains information that is internal or external to the
organization), quantification (monetary or non-monetary character of the information) and
timeframe (allows decision-making in the short run or long run, or includes past events or
future predictions) (Chenhall and Morris, 1986). A continuum is considered to be between
a “narrow scope” (only includes information about the organization, strictly monetary in
character, outdated and oriented towards the short term) and a “broad scope” (also
includes information about the organization’s environment, not monetary, far-sighted and
oriented to the long term). This variable was evaluated on the basis of four questions that
were analyzed using the scales proposed by Chenhall and Morris (1986) (Table 1) which
have been widely tested in later works (e.g. Bouwens and Abernethy, 2000; Naranjo-Gil
and Hartmann, 2007). 
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(5) We must emphasize the difficulty of accessing the specific professionals, either because of the high
number of questionnaires to which, from different sectors, they are asked to respond or because of the
reticence to provide information about the management of their company. This low response makes for a lower
participation in management control research (Gul and Chia, 1994; Bouwens and Abernethy, 2000). 
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Continuity Expectations
This is defined as the perception of a bilateral expectation of a future interaction involving
interpersonal connections, as well as an expectation of continued exchange (Heide and
John, 1990). The scale is adapted from the work of Heide and John (1990) and describes
the purchasing executive’s or the sales manager’s perceptions of continuity in the future
relationship, the actions taken by their companies, as well as those taken by the other
party (see Table 2).
Opportunistic behaviour
Opportunistic behaviour occurs when one of the parties repeatedly exaggerates its needs
to get what is desired or hides relevant information (Wuyts and Geykens, 2005), frequently
alters what has been agreed in order to obtain its objectives, or promises to do things even
though it has no real intention of doing them (Wuyts and Geykens, 2005). This variable’s
scale describes the degree to which one party shrewdly pursues its own interest, providing
erroneous or incomplete information, breaking promises, or exaggerating its needs in order
to obtain what is desired (see Table 2). The four items have been adapted from the work of
Wuyts and Geykens (2005).
Shared Management Information in Buyer/Supplier Relationships
TABLE 1.- QUESTIONS SELECTED TO MEASURE THE USEFULNESS 
OF THE BROAD SCOPE OF MCIS1
Adapted Item Original Item Item No.2
Evaluate the degree of usefulness to the relationship with this supplier/customer that may be given to the management
information that you receive from the supplier/customer or that your company provides to this supplier/customer,
considering the following characteristics3: 
Compared with information about past
events, you think that information about
future events is
Compared with internal information, you
think that information that is external to
the relationship is 
Compared with information that is
financial or monetary in nature, you
think that information that is by nature
non- financial or non- monetary is
Compared with short-term information,
you think that long-term information is
Information which relates to possible future events
(if historical information is most suitable for your
needs, mark the lower end of the scale)
Information on broad factors external to your
organization, such as economic conditions,
population growth, technological developments, etc
Non-economic information, such as customer
preferences, employee attitudes, labour relations,
attitudes of government and consumer bodies,
competitive treats, etc
Information on the effect of events on particular time
periods (e. g. monthly/ quarterly/ annual summaries,
trends, comparisons, etc.)
AM1
AM2
AM3
AM4
(1) Management control information sharing (MCIS). 
(2) In the original questionnaire, the items were not numbered. 
(3) Supplier/customer will be used in order not to duplicate the tables, considering that “supplier” appeared in
the questionnaire sent to the purchasing managers, and “client” in the questionnaires sent to the sales managers.
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Received Influence
Received influence is defined as the capacity that one party has to intervene in the set-up
of the other’s production system (Heide and Stump, 1995). This is because the companies
involved in cooperative processes normally invest in assets that lead to changes in the
production processes (Gietzmann, 1996). In this case, the scale, which was adapted from
the work of Heide and Stump (1995), describes the influence that the other party has on
the specificity of the productive process and focuses on the items that describe the
influence on the productive system (see Table 2).
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TABLE 2.- QUESTIONS SELECTED TO MEASURE CONTINUITY EXPECTATION, 
OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR AND RECEIVED INFLUENCE
Adapted Item Original Item Item No.
Now we will ask you about the characteristics of your relationship with this supplier/customer:
Your company expects that the
relationship will continue over time
You believe that your supplier/customer
expects the relationship to continue
over time
Your company makes plans based on
continuance 
The supplier/customer makes plans
based on continuance 
This supplier/customer often exaggerates
its  needs to obtain what it desires
This supplier/customer often alters
what has been agreed upon to obtain
what it wishes
This supplier/customer often promises to
do things that it does not do later on
You believe that the supplier/customer
hides important information
Your production system is adapted to the
supplier
A specific production system was
imposed on you/This client imposed a
specific production system
The parties expect this relationship to last a long
time (Heide and John, 1990; p. 30).
The parties expect this relationship to last a long
time (Heide and John, 1990; p. 30).
The parties make plans not only for the terms of the
individual purchase, but also for the continuance of
the relationship (Heide and John, 1990; p. 30)
The parties make plans not only for the terms of the
individual purchase, but also for the continuance of
the relationship (Heide and John, 1990; p. 30).
This supplier often exaggerates its needs to get what
it desires (Wuyts and Geykens, 2005, p.114).
This supplier often alters the facts to get what it
wants (Wuyts and Geykens, 2005).
This supplier often promises to do things, even
though it actually had no intention of following
through (Wuyts and Geykens, 2005).
We have reason to believe that this supplier hides
important information from us (Wuyts and
Geykens, 2005). 
Our production system has been tailored to using the
particular items bought from this supplier (Heide
and Stump, 1995).
Our production system has been tailored to using the
particular items bought from this supplier (Heide
and Stump, 1995).
EC1
EC2
EC3
EC4
CO1
CO2
CO3
CO4
IR1
IR2
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Validity and reliability of the measurements. Metric invariance assessment
This reseach project uses latent factors that have been measured with Likert 1-7 scales. This
makes it essential to accept the existence of measurement errors in the indicators for which
reason the use of Structural Equation Models is an appropriate tool for validating the scales
(using confirmatory factor analysis) as well as to test the proposed causal relationships.
A priori, both samples collected come from two different sources (purchasing managers
and sales managers). In both samples, the variables have been measured in the same way
since the purpose of the research is to know whether both parties to the relationship
behave in a consistent manner. Even though in this case the relationship has not been
examined as a dyad, which is to say, by gathering data from both parties involved in the
same relationship, studying the variables for the population of purchasing managers as
well as for the population of sales managers allows us to see whether the behaviours are
consistent in both contexts. This approximation has been considered valid in previous
studies of interorganizational relationships (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Doney and
Cannon, 1997).
The use of samples from different populations leads us to consider that both samples are
perhaps not completely equal, such that it would be appropriate to set out a multiple
structural model instead of a single model that considers the data as an aggregate (Bentler,
2006). However, before considering the assumption that both samples are equivalent as
valid, we should examine whether the populations are completely different as far as the
observed variables are concerned. It is therefore to be expected that the covariance
matrices of both samples will be different, and in this case the structural models that
generate both variance and covariance matrices are probably completely different. Thus,
there would be no reason to use multi-group analysis, but rather the correct approach
would be to propose a different model for each sample. 
However, if the populations are completely equal as regards the observed variables, both
sample variance and covariance matrices should be identical, in which case there would
therefore only be one model in which all sample parameters would be equal in both
populations. Nevertheless, in reality these two situations can be considered extremes of
the same continuum. The likelihood is that the populations in which similar behaviours
are expected a priori (as is the case) and in which the population parameters may therefore
be considered equal, will show differences when these parameters are estimated due to the
error that is produced by using sample data instead of observing the whole population.
Multi-group analysis therefore enables both samples to be simultaneously analysed which
makes it possible to verify the model when it is identical for both populations, by
4
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approximating the demographic parameters through an estimation of the sample
parameters that takes account of the error that is introduced when observing a sample
instead of the whole population (Bentler, 2006).
Multi-group analysis appears to be the most appropriate approximation for the case under
study. EQS 6.1 software for Windows was used and the models were estimated using
maximum likelihood. As the conditions that take account of the normalized value of
Mardia’s coefficient for multivariate normality were not met, the results of the robust
statistics are presented (Mardia, 1970).
The first step is to evaluate whether both samples (i.e. purchasing managers as well as
sales managers) should be considered separately or on the contrary whether a single
variance and covariance matrix exists and one vector of averages that describes both
populations. In order to do this, we used the method proposed by Steemkamp and
Baumgartner (1998) that was developed for validating scales in different countries and is
applicable to any multi-sample analysis (Bentler, 2006). The starting point of this method
is to confirm whether the variance and covariance matrices and the mean vectors are equal
in both groups. As shown in Table 3, the chi-square test of the model that considers
equality of means and of covariance in both groups is significant (p-value <.05), because
of which it is not possible to accept equality in both samples. The same happens for the
model that only considers equality of variance and covariance matrices and in the mean
equality model. In addition, having seen the results it can be concluded that the
differences between the two groups is due to the mean vectors of the indicators since that
model presents a worse fit. This means that the data must be considered as two different
groups and cannot therefore be aggregated. Consequently, multi-group analysis will be
used for validating the scales as well as to test the proposed structural model, taking into
account the differences that exist between the two groups.
J. M. Ramón, M. C. Álvarez-Dardet y D. Naranjo
TABLE 3.- MODEL COMPARISONS ACROSS SAMPLES
Model Chi-square Satorra-Bentler Degrees RMSEA CFI Robust Robust 
Chi-square of freedom RMSEA CFI
Equality of 301.460 273.150 119 0.089 0.883 0.082 0.895
and µ (0.000) (0.000) 
Equality of  196.831 166.726 105 0.067 0.895 0.055 0.912
(0.000) (0.000)
Equality of µ 101.432 - 14 0.180 0.972 - -
(0.000)
Configuration 226.930 209.3473 143 0.055 0.976 0.049 0.807
Invariance (0.000) (0.000)
Metric 163.999 150.4837 105 0.054 0.983 0.047 0.833
Invariance (0.000) (0.00241)
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Since it is a question of a multi-group analysis, the need arises to study the equivalence
between the measurements of both groups and to guarantee that the results of the
structural analysis are consistent in both groups. It is therefore necessary to consider
the metric invariance of the items (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). Metric
invariance exists when factor loadings that relate items with each latent factor are
equal in both groups. 
The ideal situation is not only to have metric invariance but also invariance in the mean
of the items, in the variances of the measurement errors and in the factor covariances and
variances (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). However, in some cases these necessary
conditions may be relaxed. Thus, it is sufficient that, in addition to the item with a loading
fixed at 1 (marker), there be at least some other item with a factor loading that may be
considered equal in both groups for the measurements to be equally consistent in both
samples. If this happens, it may be said that there is at least partial metric invariance
(Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). 
The first aspect to take into account in evaluating the metric invariance is to consider
whether the items found in the model show the same configurations, that is, if the factor
loadings are equally significant in both contexts and the proposed factors may be
described in the same way in both samples. This is what is known as configuration
invariance. Table 4 shows the factor loadings of two measurement models. Model 1
contains all of the proposed items jointly used to measure the latent factors, estimating the
correlation that exists between all the factors. It is known as a joint measurement model.
Only those items from model 1 that guaranteed the scales’ reliability and validity have
been kept in model 2, however (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In order to assure the validity
of the scales, two points have been taken into account. In the first place, the factor
loadings must be significant and, in second place, the measurement models for each latent
factor must present a suitable fit. As may be seen in Table 4, the first condition is met as
all the factor loadings showed significant values at 1%.
The second of the requirements involves the performance of a confirmatory factor
analysis for each proposed factor and in each group. In the case of the latent factors that
contained three or fewer items, it was necessary to validate them along with another
factor. This is the case for received influence in model 1, and the scope and continuity
expectation in the second model (where in each case, it was necessary to eliminate an
item to obtain the validity of the measurement) that were jointly validated with the
opportunistic behaviour. 
The measurements for goodness of fit that were obtained as a product of the factorial
analyses are presented in Table 5 (these analyses were consistent with the results obtained
in the exploratory factor analysis previously performed with the help of the SPSS 14
Shared Management Information in Buyer/Supplier Relationships
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program, in which the parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood and Varimax
rotation). As can be seen in Table 5, some of the factors did not initially present convergent
validity since the measurements for goodness of fit were not acceptable. Only
opportunistic behaviour and received influence present goodness-of-fit measurements that
are acceptable with the measurements initially proposed. The rest of the factors were
modified in order to obtain convergent validity and therefore, as may be seen from Table
5, the goodness-of-fit measurements in model 2, which is to say the confirmatory factor
model for each latent factor with some items eliminated, presented satisfactory goodness-
of-fit measurements, when the broad scope and continuity expectations factors were
measured with three instead of the four initially proposed items (item AM3 was eliminated
in the case of broad scope and EC3 for continuity expectations). Two criteria were used to
reduce the number of indicators and thereby modify the measurement models. On the one
hand, those items that presented factor loadings below 0.5 in some groups were eliminated.
On the other, items were eliminated in an effort to increase the value of the variance
extracted (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; p. 46). As can be seen in Table 4, the eliminated
items were those that presented lower factor loadings in each factor when the factor
analysis was carried out together with all the measurements.
Model 2 in Table 4 was reached by following this procedure where those items were
maintained that met the reliability and validity criteria in both groups.
Discriminatory validity is another of the points to take into consideration when accepting
invariance with regard to configuration. In the joint measurement model (in which all the
correlations between factors are included) the latent factors must be independent, which
is the case in both samples given that all the correlations between the squared factors are
less than the average variance extracted (AVE) for the factors (Fornell and Larcker, 1981)
(see Table 6). In this way, validity is reached in the configuration of the measurements for
both samples. (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998)
The joint measurement model (for both samples performed by means of the multi-
group analysis and considering all the related factors) that is proposed as valid would
include the items proposed in Model 2 of Table 4. This model’s fit may not be entirely
rejected as the values of CFI and RMSEA were acceptable: (Chi-square: 146.371; p-
value: 0.000; degrees of freedom: 97; GFI: 0.895; CFI: 0.986; RMSEA: 0.051; Satorra-
Bentler Chi-square: 137.697; p-value: 0.004; Robust CFI: 0.851; Robust RMSEA:
0,047). These results lead us to accept Model 2 as the best approximation of the
configuration invariance.
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(1) *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. The values presented in the Table correspond to the standardized
loadings (t-values appear in parenthesis). AVE = Average Variance Extracted.
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TABLE 4.- METRIC INVARIANCE ASSESSMENT ACROSS GROUPS1
Standardized factor loadings
F1- Broad Scope
Factor Purchasing Sales Purchasing Sales Metric
Manager Manager Manager Manager Invariance
Model 1 Model 2
F2- Opportunistic behaviour
AM1 0.605 0.699 0.700 0.692 Marker 
AM2 0.744*** 0.380*** 0.692*** 0.418*** Invariant
(4.829) (2.599) (4.641) (2.822)
AM3 0.539*** 0.455*** - -
(3.265) (3.09)
AM4 0.589*** 0.712*** 0.564*** 0.698*** Invariant
(4.474) (4.033) (4.406) (3.112)
Reliability 0.715 0.655 0.691 0.637
AVE 0.389 0.337 0.429 0.380
CO1 0.586 0.736 0.584 0.735 Marker
CO2 0.748*** 0.846*** 0.746*** 0.846*** Invariant
(5.045) (8.311) (5.037) (8.323)
CO3 0.772*** 0.880*** 0.775*** 0.879*** Invariant
(5.514) (7.677) (5.500) (7.693)
CO4 0.742*** 0.745*** 0.740*** 0.746*** Invariant
(5.370) (6.976) (5.322) (6.991)
Reliability 0.806 0.879 0.806 0.879
AVE 0.512 0.647 0.511 0.646
F4- Continuity Expectations
EC1 0.853 0.729 0.784 0.648 Marker
EC2 0.764*** 0.871*** 0.831*** 0.990*** Invariant
(7.762) (6.523) (4.099) (4.538)
EC3 0.537*** 0.482***
(6.997) (3.622) - -
EC4 0.7*** 0.694*** 0.722*** 0.660*** Invariant
(4.75) (4.488) (4.099) (4.011)
Reliability 0.810 0.794 0.823 0.819
AVE 0.522 0.501 0.609 0.612
F3- Received Influence
IR1 0.643*** 0.601*** 0.614*** 0.600*** Invariant
(2.353) (6.912) (2.591) (6.896)
IR2 0.495 0.986 0.519 0.986 Marker
Reliability 0.491 0.791 0.487 0.790
AVE 0.329 0.667 0.323 0.666
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(1) Recommended values to guarantee fit: Robust RMSEA <0.05, p-value>0.05 GFI>0.9 AGFI>0.9.
TABLE 5.- CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS1
Goodness-of-fit Measurements
Factor Purchasing Sales Purchasing Sales
Manager Manager Manager Manager
Model 1 Model 2
Broad Scope Chi-square 9.575 1.497 20.908 13.950
4 items/ 3 Degrees of freedom 2 2 14 14
items p-value 0.008 0.473 0.104 0.453
GFI 0.901 0.992 0.947 0.957
AGFI 0.805 0.960 0.894 0.914
Satorra-Bentler Chi- square 7.647 1.631 18.767 14.905
p-value 0.022 0.442 0.174 0.385
Robust RMSEA 0.166 0.00 0.057 0.027
Continuity Chi- square 16.546 25.262 28.295 23.819
Expectations Degrees of freedom 2 2 14 14
4 items/ p-value 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.048
3 items GFI 0.930 0.900 0.931 0.934
AGFI 0.652 0.499 0.861 0.868
Satorra-Bentler Chi-square 6.672 18.587 22.510 15.874
p-value 0.036 0.00 0.069 0.3211
Robust RMSEA 0.151 0.305 0.077 0.039
Received Chi- square 25.334 20.352 = =
Influence Degrees of freedom 9 9 = =
2 items p-value 0.003 0.016 = =
GFI 0.930 0929 = =
AGFI 0.836 0.835 = =
Satorra-Bentler Chi- square 19.826 16.241 = =
p-value 0.019 0.062 = =
Robust RMSEA 0.108 0.095 = =
Opportunistic Chi- square 0.891 3.604 = =
Behaviour Degrees of freedom 2 2 = =
4 items p-value 0.640 0.165 = =
GFI 0.996 0.980 = =
AGFI 0.979 0.901 = =
Satorra-Bentler Chi- square 0.559 3.008 = =
p-value 0.756 0.222 = =
Robust RMSEA 0.00 0.075 = =
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The configuration invariance was a step prior to verification of the metric invariance as the
joint measurement model previously proposed does not indicate whether the individuals of
the two groups understood, and consequently responded to the questions that were put to
them in the same way. Following the procedure proposed by Steenkamp and Baumgartner
(1998), it becomes necessary to check whether there is metric invariance. In order to
accomplish that, the previously accepted configuration invariance model was tested using
the chi-square difference statistic corrected by Satorra and Bentler (2001) to establish
whether it differs significantly from an alternative model in which all the equal factor
loadings in the two groups are considered (metric invariance model in Table 3). The results
of this test show that there are no significant differences in the two models (Satorra-Bentler
Scaled Difference: 12.461; degrees of freedom: 8; chi-square p-value: 0.132). This shows
that the metric invariance is accepted for the proposed items in model 2. Additionally,
Lagrange multipliers, also known as LMtest (Bentler, 2006), show that the imposed
restrictions are appropriate and as none of them is significant they can be kept in the
model, thereby contributing consistency and validity to the measurements in both samples
(Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). 
Test of hypotheses
In order to evaluate metric invariance it was necessary to use Structural Equation Models
and multi-group analysis. The same tools will be used to contrast the proposed hypotheses
in this section for the reasons discussed in the previous section concerning the use of the
multi-group analysis as an analytical tool for populations with similar behaviours
estimated by the sample parameters. The standardized loadings and the level of
significance of the proposed relationships appear in Table 7. They also included the direct
relationships between the use of the scope of the management control information and the
opportunistic behaviour and the received influence, as shown by the arrows with dotted
lines in Figure 2 aiming to examine the measurement relationship of the continuity
expectations in the model.
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TABLE 6.- DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY: PURCHASING MANAGER AND SALES MANAGER1
Purchasing Manager Sales Manager
F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4
F1 - Broad Scope 0.429a 0.380a
F2 - Continuity Expectations 0.054 0.511a 0.005 0.646a
F3 - Received Influence 0.029 0.255 0.323a 0.001 0.001 0.666a
F4 - Opportunistic Behaviour 0.165 0.141 0.008 0.609a 0.102 0.108 0.021 0.612a
(1) Variance extracted is indicated with a “a” (the values of the correlations between factors squared can be
found below the diagonal).
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FIGURE 2.- RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Usefulness of the
Broad Scope of
MCIS
Continuity
Expectations
Opportunistic
Behaviour
Received 
Influence
H1 + *
H2 - *
H3 n.s.
(1) *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. The values presented in the Table correspond to the standardized
loadings (t-values appear in parenthesis). Recommended values to guarantee the fit: Robust RMSEA <0.05,
p-value>0.05, CFI>0.9, GFI>0.9 and AGFI>0.9.
TABLE 7.- RESULTS OF THE STRUCTURAL MODEL1
Proposed Model Adjusted Model 
Independent Dependent Purchasing Sales Purchasing Sales
Variables Variables Manager Manager Manager Manager
Model Fit
Broad Scope Continuity Expectations 0.296*** 0.319*** 0.289*** 0.303***
(2.847) (2.376) (2.861) (2.331)
Broad Scope Opportunistic Behaviour -0.169 0.071 - -
(-0.791) (0.243)
Broad Scope Received Influence -0.306 -0.023 - -
(-0.914) (-0.061)
Continuity Expectations Opportunistic Behaviour -0.601** -0.624*** -0.711*** -0.602***
(-2.018) (-2.760) (-2.709) (2.977)
Continuity Expectations Received Influence -0.055 0.389 - -
(-0.140) (1.239)
Chi-Square (p-value) 174.593 (0.000) 94.888 (0.044)
S-B Chi (p-value) 159.782 (0.001) 84.759 (0.164)
Degrees of freedom 107 73
CFI 0.980 0.965
Robust CFI 0.806 0.977
GFI 0.877 0.910
AGFI 0.821 0.864
RMSEA 0.057 0.040
Robust RMSEA 0.051 0.029
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(6) The symbol of the relationship in Figure 2 is shown with a “+” if the relationship is positive and with a
“-” if it is negative. In addition, if the relationship is significant it is marked with a “*”. 
The results of the proposed model show differences between the purchasing executive
and the sales manager (Table 7). In the first place, the use of the scope of management
control information in the broad sense has a positive and significant6 effect both for
the purchasing managers and for the sales managers (Figure 2). Thus, the companies
that develop a collaborative relationship with their clients and suppliers will have to
consider that when broadening the content of the management control information, in
the case of the businesses that cooperate, the most useful information will be the
external, non-financial, long-term, future-oriented information, if they wish to
increase the continuity expectations of the relationship. These results lead us to
accept hypothesis 1.
As for the proposed relationship in hypothesis 2, which proposed that greater
continuity expectations would lead to less opportunistic behaviour, the results of both
the purchasing managers and the sales managers samples show a negative and
significant relationship (Table 7, Figure 2). Thus, we may also accept hypothesis 2 as
it is proposed.
As for hypothesis 3, which proposed that the greater the continuity expectations the
greater the influence of one party on the production system of the other, the results are
contradictory between the purchasing managers and the sales managers, the former
having a negative sign and latter a positive one. However, in no case is it significant
(Table 7).
The proposed theoretical model analyzed the continuity expectations as a mediator
between the variables of the model. Direct relationships were introduced between the
usefulness of the scope of the management control information and opportunistic
behaviour and received influence, in order to verify whether the measurement is pure
or, if on the contrary, there are also direct effects. The results show that these direct
effects are not significant; therefore, we can consider the measurement pure. In
addition, given that received influence has no significant relations with the rest of the
variables and with the objective of improving the model’s fit, we considered the
elimination of the non-significant relationships. With these modifications, a new
adjusted model was built, in which the same significant relationships as proposed in
hypotheses 1 and 2 continue to be upheld, for the purchasing managers as well as the
sales managers. In addition, the model’s fit improves and begins to display acceptable
values (see Table 7).
Lastly, in the annex the variance and covariance matrix is presented, which includes the
variables used for measuring the latent factors, in both cases the purchasing manager and
the sales manager.
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to examine the use of management control information in a buyer-
supplier relationship, analyzing how the exchange of information could affect the
generation of the parties’ expectations and how these would influence desirable behaviour,
avoiding opportunist behaviour and increasing mutual influence between the production
systems. The results show that broader content of control information allows increasing
continuity expectations intervening in the parties’ behaviour and reducing opportunistic
behaviours. Concretely, it can be seen that management control information on future
events, environmental factors and oriented towards the long term, as opposed to
information about past events, internal to the relationship and oriented towards the short
term, supports the parties’ expectations regarding the continuance of the relationship with
its suppliers and industrial customers. This allows us to confirm the importance that this
broad scope had within the organization (Bouwens and Abernethy, 2000), as a determinant
of the coordination of tasks between departments (Chenhall and Morris, 1986), activity
planning (Abernethy and Lillis, 1995), and business decentralization or performance (Mia
and Chenhall, 1994; Naranjo-Gil, 2004); it is also useful in buyer-supplier relationships,
by which the spectrum of the usefulness of management control information can be
expanded to interorganizational relationships.
On the other hand, our results show that greater continuity expectation reduces opportunistic
behaviour. Thus, purchasing managers and sales managers, given the mediating characteristic
these expectations have in our model, can exchange broad scope in management control
information in order to stimulate desirable behaviours in the relationship, prevent possible
breaks and allow the advantages that stem from the relationship itself to be maintained (Dyer,
1996; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000).
As regards the relationship between the continuity expectations and the received influence
in the production systems, even though the literature review showed a positive relationship
between them, our results were inconclusive. The non-significance of the relationships
may be due to aspects such as the development of joint actions (Heide and Stump, 1995)
or the coordination of tasks that may have a greater impact on the adaptation of the
production systems (Dekker, 2004). In other words, it would be necessary to analyze all
the specific assets together, not only the production systems, given the high interrelation
of this and other aspects, such as the training of personnel or the geographic location of
the production facilities (Dyer, 1996; Anderson and Dekker, 2005).
Lastly, cooperation between businesses, as has been pointed out, generates advantages for
the participants. In this study, we have focused our efforts on identifying how broad scope
of management control information is useful in collaborative relationships between
consumer goods manufacturing companies and their suppliers and clients, even though our
5
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results can be extrapolated to any relationship between companies where there is
cooperation and freedom to enter or leave the relationship. Nevertheless, this broad scope
could also generate continuity expectations in other types of relationships where the
degree of dependence between parties is greater or freedom to leave the relationship is
limited. Such is the case with relationships where the supplier has only one industrial
client due to the product being very specialized, or the members of a distribution channel
that exclusively supplies only one brand or product. A future line of research would be to
analyze the use of management control information in non-cooperative relationships. 
This research like any empirical research has its limitations; some are related to the data
collection method. The survey does not allow the causality of the relationships to be
analysed, as the data is collected at a certain point in time. In addition, any generalization
of the results should be carried out with caution, as the chosen sectors may contain certain
unconsidered idiosyncrasies, though we think the sectors have a common pattern that
makes it feasible to generalize the results.
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